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Part 2: Leadership Structures and Processes
POWER MAY BE CENTRALISED, BUT THE CENTRE’S DEPENDENCE  
ON SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION REMAINS
The leadership transition in 2012/13 did not just mark a clear handover of power to a new gen-
eration of top leaders: it also redirected the Chinese political system in some rather radical ways. 
Starting a major (and still ongoing) anti-corruption campaign was but one signal from the lead-
ership showing its political determination to bring about change. The new leadership also put 
forward an ambitious catalogue of new goals and mechanisms for policymaking, embodied by 
the CCP’s “decision on major issues concerning comprehensively deepening reforms” unveiled at 
the 18th Central Committee’s 3rd plenum in November 2013. Containing a strong mandate to 
push forward major reforms, the decision gives top priority to policies that call for increased mar-
ket orientation. It simultaneously provides for an enhanced top-down, centralised governance 
mode that leaves no doubt that the CCP has ultimate control (Ahlers et al. 2013). In 2016, most of 
the policy-related decisions were further elaborated upon in the 13th Five-year plan of the PRC 
(2016–2020). 
Progress towards these goals, and the ultimate success of the CCP’s reform plans, critically de-
pends on subnational governments, especially at the provincial, municipal and county levels. In the 
past, the central leadership often faced local circumvention or covert non-compliance in response 
to new initiatives. Therefore, one of the biggest challenges the current core executive inherited 
was enforcing compliance and guaranteeing eective and sustainable policy implementation. 
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KEY FINDINGS
  China’s leadership under Xi has rein-
forced the party’s hierarchical command 
structures, demonstrated through its 
top-down campaigns, focusing on aus-
terity, anti-corruption eorts and party 
discipline. It has reinvigorated sanction-
ing and incentive mechanisms for local 
cadres, with unknown eects on their 
long-term performance and loyalty to 
the CCP. 
  Re-centralising the intergovernmental 
financial system strengthens the overall 
steering capacity of the central govern-
ment temporarily, but does not alleviate 
the fiscal stress on local governments. 
The central government is pushing for 
greater market orientation at the local 
level, resulting, thus far, in short-sight-
ed solutions that will end up reducing 
transparency concerning local debt. 
  Local leaders are abstaining from bold 
policy moves out of fear of demotion, 
exclusion from the party, or legal reper-
cussions. Consequently, subnational 
governments have ceased to act as 
independent actors of policy initiative 
and innovation. Policy piloting and ex-
perimentation will remain an important 
component of the policy process, but 
will be employed only very selectively 
and under the auspices of the central 
government.
  These reconfigurations of central-local 
relations give the central leadership 
more tools to enforce local compliance, 
and they appear to be eective in the 
short term. But they will suocate 
subnational policy initiative, ultimately 
undermining the adaptive capacity of 
the Chinese state.
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Increasingly concerned about rampant corruption in China’s far-flung administrative system 
and unable to tolerate ine!cient policy implementation in a slowing economy, the CCP leadership 
was left with little choice but to reorganise central-local relations. In this essay, we consider the 
most prominent measures taken thus far and posit that these measures have indeed significantly 
reconfigured central-local relations. Our essay includes initial assessments of the impact of in-
dividual reconfigurations. We conclude with a general outlook on potential short- and long-term 
developments. 
THE CCP LEADERSHIP UNDER XI REINVIGORATES  
HIERARCHICAL COMMAND STRUCTURES 
Several central-level structural changes have concentrated power in the hands of the top lead-
ership, but the extent to which this has aected central-local relations diers by issue area. The 
Leading Small Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reform (CDRLSG), established shortly after 
the 3rd Plenum and under the direct leadership of Xi Jinping, has had by far the most immediate 
impact on central-local relations and on local operations. The group is meant to supervise reform 
progress in the key policy areas identified in the 2013 decision and it took over part of the deci-
sion-making powers that originally were vested in other LSGs and the State Council (for details, 
see: Miller 2014). This new centralised steering body is furthermore mirrored at almost every level 
of the governmental hierarchy, as subnational governments established equivalent LSGs on com-
prehensively deepening reform in order to answer to the new extensive central calls. 
Clarification of responsibilities and increased transparency
In March 2013, Li Keqiang announced a major programme for transforming the role of the govern-
ment, including deregulation and streamlining of competencies. As a result, the responsibilities 
and portfolios of various government units are more specific than ever before. Publicly available 
“power lists” ( ) provide an overview of competencies of individual government units. 
They act as a service-oriented reform, intended to accommodate the demands of “clients” (mainly 
citizens and entrepreneurs) for accessibility and procedural transparency (Stepan 2015). Arguably, 
however, their real purpose is to increase procedural e!ciency, as they signal which organisation-
al units have the necessary competencies (and mandate) to make certain decisions. While the CCP 
likely still considers local experimentation important for policy innovation, it has actually reduced 
subnational governments’ overall discretionary power. This diminishes both zeal for experimenta-
tion and room for innovation.
Cadre evaluation: demotion has turned into a real threat 
Similarly, the central government has introduced more sophisticated policy performance targets 
as part of the reform of the cadre evaluation system. Firstly, compared to previous administrations, 
the most recent programmes with performance targets contain strikingly few binding targets. 
This smaller number of goals – even though the goals themselves may be comparatively di!cult 
to achieve – should mean that they are more attainable for local leadership, and the central gov-
ernment has clearly enunciated the absolute necessity of their implementation. At the same time, 
the centre has adjusted the criteria of target contracts and the cadre evaluation system, which 
stretches across all governmental levels. Underscoring the top leadership’s decree that economic 
growth can no longer oset underperformance in other policy areas. Enhanced monitoring of cad-
res’ performance on priority issues, such as public service provision and environmental protection, 
now accompanies what used to be an almost exclusive focus on GDP growth. 
This all means increased complexity and even heavier burdens for local administrators. If 
they deliver, they can expect to rise. If they fail to do so, the government has a new sanction-
ing mechanism at hand: demotion. Whereas in the past, demotion was rarely used except as a 
tool in party discipline inspection, central guidelines issued in 2015 by the central government 
and transposed by most subnational governments in the meantime, make demotion a real threat 
(SCMP 2015). The recent adaptations may have been necessary to strengthen control over local 
implementation, but they could end up causing opposition among local cadres. 
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RESTRUCTURING LOCAL FINANCES:  
TAPPING NEW SOURCES AS OLD ONES RUN DRY
For more than two decades, subnational governments in China have faced increasing fiscal pres-
sure. Unfunded mandates have driven them to search for new sources of income to finance public 
services and infrastructure projects. The new leadership has enumerated even more deliverables 
expected of subnational governments, while simultaneously reducing their sources of income 
through stricter regulation of land sales, real estate deals, and local financing platforms. Thus the 
question arises: how can the solvency of local governments be guaranteed as they are tasked to 
provide more services with less money? 
Local and central government are searching for new financial sources
The central government has done little with respect to increasing local governments’ fiscal base. 
Instead, it is expanding upon previous adjustments to the intergovernmental transfer system. 
Since 2012 the central government has been increasing the share of general transfers. This marks 
the end of a project-based approach that is built around earmarks for particular projects, trans-
ferred to subnational levels (Ahlers 2014). 
While the new system apparently allows subnational governments more flexibility in allocat-
ing the funds they receive from the centre, “managing scarcity” still rules the day, as the amount 
of funding continues to be insu!cient. 
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Local governments under increasing fiscal pressure
Central government transfers, local revenue sources and deficits of local governments (2012 – 2016)
   Local revenue sources, amount, in trillion CNY
   General transfers, amount, in trillion CNY
   Earmarked transfers, amount, in trillion CNY
   Deficit local governments, amount, in trillion CNY
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As a solution to this problem, the central government has prescribed a “market-orientation”. 
It is stridently calling on local governments to invoke “social capital”, essentially meaning private 
commitments. This involves donations or corporate social responsibility (CSR) measures from local 
state and private enterprises as well as increased reliance on contractors or “non-governmental 
organisations” to provide services, especially in the health and care sector. 
“Decentralising” market orientation still happening under extreme hierarchy
The strongest symbols of this new market orientation are the new “investment companies” (
), which act as industry policy vehicles for subsidy allocation, local favourable industry 
schemes, and business project funding and loans at the local level. Former government o!cials 
flock to become chairmen of these new institutions. They can be described as “semi-capitalist” 
local agencies, but their priorities are largely set behind the scenes by the enormous top-down 
steering in the background.
Local finances still unsustainable in the long term as implicit debt continues to rise 
Local debts are on the rise. The last o!cial release of data on local debt dates to mid-2013. Ac-
cording to the National Audit o!ce, debt amounted to CNY 17.9 trillion. The implementation of 
a debt-for-bonds swap programme, allowing local governments to refinance a portion of their 
maturing debts via bond issuances in 2015, is another sign of the dire state of local finances. 
According to a report by the Economist Intelligence Unit, provinces issued around CNY 600 billion 
in new bonds and converted debts worth CNY 3.2 trillion in 2015 alone (cf. EIU 2016).
In addition, the centre has endorsed Public Private Partnerships (PPP) as a panacea for fis-
cal gap problems. PPPs might provide local governments with a new source of income to realise 
certain projects, but their use in China and elsewhere has shown that they also create problems 
of their own. Overuse of PPPs carries with it the danger that short-term financial considerations 
outweigh longer-term ones as the main drivers of PPP establishment. As of now, local govern-
ment priorities and their power over the involved companies are still the more critical factors in 
the setting up of PPPs, overriding the involved companies’ economic considerations.
RIGOROUS PARTY DISCIPLINE INSPECTION PARALYSES 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTIONS
The CCP leadership fears disintegration and has called “decentralism” a major evil. Through the 
several key steps outlined above, the CCP is pushing for increased eectiveness and standardisa-
tion in local-level policy implementation. Apparently aware that intensified pressure on local gov-
ernments could “over-stretch” the system, the central leadership has employed a set of seemingly 
anachronistic tools in an attempt to enforce compliance: a nationwide anti-corruption campaign, 
enhanced discipline inspection, and ideological training.
More frequent and stricter forms of discipline enforcement
At the local level, the pervasiveness of the anti-corruption campaign and its attendant discipli-
nary measures is striking. Over 90 per cent of ousted o!cials were cadres at the county level or 
below. High sta turnover levels and recruitment eorts are consuming substantial proportions 
of the remaining experienced o!cials’ available time. Furthermore, thorough disciplinary inspec-
tions at these lower levels also means that the actual business of governance often slows for 
weeks at a time, and exchanges with other departments, stakeholders and external advisors 
essentially stops. 
Aside from the ever-increasing inspection tours by higher-level organs, discipline supervision 
is also manifesting itself in a more permanent form on the local government level. Nearly all local 
departments now host at least one “disciplinary agent” ( ) who oversees and screens all 
activities, meetings, inspection tours, publications, etc.
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Using ideology as a means to enforce policy compliance and e!ectiveness
The CCP no longer values policy eectiveness or pragmatic policy solutions on their own. It now 
requires ideological obedience and ultimate loyalty to the Party’s core values and developmental 
priorities. 
This is reflected in reinvigorated ideological training. Leading cadres spend weeks or months 
reciting “core” works in Party school courses and are responsible for holding frequent “study ses-
sions” with their sta. This alienates local administrators from top-level leadership, as they see 
these training sessions as wasting both time and resources. Thus, such ideological measures are 
unlikely to enhance policy eectiveness and implementation in the long run and may in fact pro-
duce the opposite result: an increasing number of experienced local o!cials will probably leave 
the civil service, stripping the party-state nexus of its most valuable resource for managing the 
mounting challenges for governing the country.
OUTLOOK: SHORT TERM GAIN, LONG TERM PAIN
Drawing from the initial assessment of these reconfigurations, we conclude that the short- and 
long-term prospects of policy eectiveness are quite dierent:
  In the short term, reduced local discretionary power breaks down local circumvention to central 
policies and benefits programme implementation.
  In the long term, unless the centre eases up somewhat on subnational actors and improves 
the fiscal basis of local governments, local policy initiative will be completely suocated. This 
would have significant negative implications for the adaptive capacity of the Chinese state and 
its recently improved record in providing public goods. 
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